


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
Our democratic principles require that the American people be informed of the activities of their Government...Nevertheless, throughout our history, the national defense has required that certain information be maintained in confidence in order to protect our citizens, our democratic institutions, our homeland security, and our interactions with foreign nations. Protecting information critical to our Nation's security and demonstrating our commitment to open Government through *accurate and accountable application of classification standards* and routine, secure, and effective declassification are equally important priorities.





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
Some Key Changes from previous EO


- Section 1.7(c) Prohibits the reclassification of information after its declassification and release under proper authority except when agencies can comply with significantly tightened restrictions, particularly regarding records that have been accessioned into the National Archives.
- Section 3.1(d) "In some exceptional cases, however, the need to protect such information may be outweighed by the public interest in disclosure of the information, and in these cases the information should be declassified."
























Executive Order 13526

Glomar Response

"The Department of Seriousness has determined that the fact of the existence or nonexistence of records, which would reveal a connection or interest in the matters set forth in your request, is classified in accordance with Executive Order 13526. Therefore, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1), DoS has denied your request. By this statement, the Department neither confirms nor denies that such records may or may not exist. Please understand that, for this reason, we have not done a search for responsive records."



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| 5. (U) C3 for North American Air Defense a. (8) | | |
| b. (U) Capability (1) (\$) | | |
| (2) رکھری (2) | | |
| (3) (3) | | I A |
| c. (U) Rationale (1) (\$5) | | |
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| Durchassifier Proprietary Rights. According to the NAVAIR program manager, the reason for not breaking each oxes or direct nurchase. Interpretent proprietary Rights. According to the NAVAIR program manager, the reason for not breaking each oxes. Interpretent proprietary Rights. According to the NAVAIR program manager, the reason for not breaking each oxes. Interpretent proprietary in the mid-1982. Our review of available documentation indicated that the pocial tooling in question had been paid for by the Government of the Government for to its use on a noninterference. objection to its use on a noninterference. Interpretent proprietary interpretent on the NaVAI control of the Government for proprietary interpretent on stage on a noninterference. outs usage. (Defense Acquisition Regulation 7-104.25). Even if a legal claim for proprietary interpretent on stage on a noninterference. outs and proprietary Stage and be achieved by purchasing the genzows. Tor example, the Navy's Aviation Supply Office in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, purchased the for species decreaser genzows ofdered from General Electric. General Electric's price is by a breaken on the \$124,880 price negotiated by NAVAIR with Kamaan in June 1982 on onstatinally lower than the \$124,880 price negotiated by NAVAIR with Kamaan in June 1982 on onstating out these items. Obstatinially lower than the \$124,880 price negotiated by General Electric and Kamaan were by softicials have stated that the overhead and profit charged by General Electric and Kamaan were by softicials have stated that the overhead and profit charged by General Electric and Kamaan were by sofficials have stated that athough breakout could save | | | |
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